The effects of equipment investment on relative wages and employment of skilled labor are estimated. The basic hypothesis is that such effects are positive, because of the presence of either equipment᎐skill complementarity or skill advantage in technology adoption. Using a panel data set for a wide range of countries, the relative wage and relative employment of skilled workers are regressed on lagged investment in machinery and other relevant variables. The results indicate a positive and strong effect of machinery investment on the relative demand for skilled labor, with the relative wage responding much sooner and for a much shorter time than relative employment. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: E24. ᮊ
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the effect of equipment investment on relative wages and employment of skilled labor. This effect is thought of as working through two alternative and not mutually exclusive transmission 1 The authors thank Ricardo Hausmann and an anonymous referee for very useful comments. This paper was prepared while the authors were visiting at the Inter-American Development Bank. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the IDB or the Bank of Israel. The authors thank Martin Loser and Erik Wachtenheim for skillful research assistance. 2 To whom correspondence should be addressed.
mechanisms: equipment᎐skill complementarity and skill advantage in technology adoption. These two mechanisms imply that equipment investment should be accompanied by a higher relative demand for skilled labor. The paper extends the existing literature in two respects. First, it tests directly the link between equipment investment and relative wages and employment of skilled labor. Second, the analysis is carried out using a panel data set with a wide range of countries. Equipment᎐skill complementarity is a characteristic of the production function: equipment and skilled labor are complements, while equipment and unskilled labor are substitutes. Hence, equipment investment, by increasing the equipment stock, should generate higher relative demand for skilled labor. Capital᎐skill complementarity received empirical support Ž . from Griliches 1969 , who used U.S. data, and since then from others. Ž . Recently, Krusell et al. 1997 analyzed income inequality in the United States, assuming this property of aggregate production technology.
Skill advantage in technology adoption is a related but different mechanism. Assuming that new technologies are embodied in new equipment, this mechanism involves a temporary productivity loss following investment, which can be alleviated by the use of skilled labor. Bartel and Ž . Lichtenberg 1987 found empirical support for the importance of this Ž . mechanism. Greenwood and Yorukoglu 1997 analyzed the skill-intensive process of technology adoption in a general equilibrium framework and provided historical evidence supporting the presence of a skill advantage in the adoption of new technologies. The adoption process was also ad-Ž . dressed by Grossman and Helpman 1991 , who analyzed the mechanism Ž . of imitating technologies developed elsewhere, and by Jovanovic 1995 , who stressed the relative importance of adoption costs over invention costs.
Ž . Several other studies, e.g., Johnson 1992 and Berman et al. Ž . 1994 , concluded that the major cause of the large relative wage increase of skilled workers during the 1980s in the United States was skill-biased technological change. Under the assumption that skill-biased technological change is embodied in equipment, this mechanism is similar to equipment᎐skill complementarity, since it affects the labor market via the stock of equipment.
The impact of new equipment on labor market differentials is particularly important for developing economies, such as those Latin American countries undergoing rapid privatization and opening up to international trade. As this process entails large-scale investment in new equipment, it has the potential to have large differential effects on the demand for Ž . skilled and unskilled labor. For example, Feenstra and Hanson 1995 found that the relative wages of skilled workers in Mexico, particularly in industries located close to the U.S. border, increased with trade liberalization and the ensuing import of capital goods. This paper focuses on the quantitative importance and dynamics of equipment investment effects on skilledrunskilled labor market differentials, using data from a wide range of countries. 3 The analysis consists of panel regressions that address separately the wage and employment ratios, which were obtained from different sources. The wage ratio regressions are for 37᎐39 countries, and the employment ratio regressions are for 35 countries. 4 Within the present framework and given the available data, the two mechanismsᎏequipment᎐skill complementarity and skill advantage in technology adoptionᎏare observationally equivalent.
The results suggest that investment in equipment raises the relative demand for skilled labor, with relative wages responding after 1 year and relative employment after 3 years. The wage response lasts for 1 to 2 years only, while the employment response lasts for at least 6 years. A 1-year, one-percentage point increase in the equipment investmentroutput ratio raises the relative wage by 6 to 7% with a lag of 1 year, while the impact on relative employment reaches 1.5% after 3 years and declines gradually thereafter. Treating equipment investment as an explanatory variable raises the question of a possible simultaneity bias. This is discussed below, and we conclude that such a bias, if it exists, should not have an important effect on the results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the hypothesis on the effect of equipment investment on labor market differentials under the two alternative transmission mechanisms. Section 3 addresses econometric considerations and the estimation procedure, discussing the observational equivalence between the two mechanisms given the available data. Section 4 describes the data sources, their weaknesses, and the procedure adopted here to minimize them. The results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper. Berman et al. 1995 also use a cross-country data set and find positive correlation between changes in the employment of skilled workers in manufacturing across industrial countries. Their presumption is that the same technological changes must take place in many developed countries within the same decade, leading to positive correlation if there is a skill bias. 4 Within each panel, the sample periods vary for different countries, i.e., the panel data sets are unbalanced, with wage data ranging from the middle 1980s to 1992, and the employment data ranging from the early 1970s to 1992.
THE HYPOTHESIS UNDER TWO ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS

Equipment᎐Skill Complementarity
''Equipment᎐skill complementarity'' refers to production function features: equipment and skilled labor are complements, while equipment and unskilled labor are substitutes. To elaborate on these features, the first basic element is the aggregate production function,
Ž . labor, respectively; and z j is an exogenous neutral productivity shock. It is t assumed that there is no labor mobility across countries. The main Ž . assumption about f и , stated above, is that f ) 0 and f -0. In
contrast, structures are hypothesized to complement both skilled and
One example of a functional form satisfying all of these conditions is the Ž .
Ž . of the type studied by Krusell et al. 1997 .
The second basic element is the evolution of equipment,
Ž . Ž . income accountants. Equation 2 incorporates the standard time-to-build assumption, i.e., that there is a one-period lag between the production of investment goods and the time at which they become productive. The 5 In practice, however, isolating quality improvements is a very difficult task, which Ž . seemingly is performed only partially in national income accounts. Gordon 1990 carried out a very careful computation of a quantity-adjusted price index of equipment, which makes it possible to infer q for the United States.
Ž . partial derivatives in 2 are positive and declining in value for higher lags due to physical depreciation. should have positive effects on the relative wages and employment of skilled labor. These effects are assumed to diminish with the lags, as the adoption process advances. Current investment, i j q , represents conteme t t poraneous production, while adoption starts only after the equipment goods are incorporated into the capital stock. Under both mechanismsᎏequipment᎐skill complementarity and skill advantage in technology adoptionᎏthe nature of the capital evolution equation implies that it should be lagged investment variables which affect the labor variables. Both mechanisms also imply that the effect of lagged equipment investment on relative wages and employment is temporary and declines with the lagᎏin the first mechanism because of depreciation, and in the second because of progress in adoption. Hence, the two mechanisms lead to a similar hypothesis regarding the effect of equipment investment on labor market differentials.
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Ž . The standard form of 2 is the linear specification of the perpetual inventory approach.
ECONOMETRIC IMPLICATIONS
General Considerations
In a general equilibrium framework, the determination of equipment investment, in consumption units, can be described by
Ž .
e t e t t where x j is a country-specific vector of exogenous or predetermined state t variables. 7 Accordingly, real investment is given by
Ž . and . what follows ; the real investment variables are expressed as ratios to output to make them comparable across countries; x is the observablẽ 7 The importance of the q-type of technical change as a force driving equipment invest-Ž . ment is suggested by , who found that it is the main source of U.S. postwar growth. 8 In this setup, investment at time t involves only capital goods of quality q , which, by t assumption, is higher than that of previous vintages. In practice, investment may also involve previous vintages. If data on the actual qs across countries were available, one could isolate the net effect of new technologies. However, as mentioned in Footnote 5, quality-adjusted price indices are rarely available so far. Hence, we cannot disentangle the pure effect of technology from the factors determining the extent of its adoption. Separating these two elements is relevant because a change in I is likely to have different implications, depending e on whether it is due to a shift in q or in i . This seems an interesting avenue for future e research, as quality-adjustment procedures in national income accounts improve.
subset of x; and , are error terms, which are addressed below. 9 The w l main predictions, following the discussion in Section 2, are
The error terms and reflect relative shocks to the labor market. A w l pertinent question is whether these relative shocks, if predicted in advance, could be correlated with lagged investment. In other words, could the estimated ␤ s be biased because of simultaneity? There are two cases Ž . to consider in this respect: 1 Neither equipment᎐skill complementarity nor skill advantage in technology adoption holds. In this case, investment depends only on expected aggregate economic activity variables, which should be uncorrelated with the relative shocks to the labor market.
Ž . Hence, there is no bias in this case and the ␤ s should be zero. 2 Either skill advantage in technology adoption or equipment᎐skill complementarity holds. In this case, a bias may exist because investment would be negatively affected by the expected value of w rw . To see this, consider a 1 2 current increase in the relative supply of skilled labor, predicted in advance, which is not captured in x and thus is reflected in a lower and w a higher . Given that investment reacted positively since the time the l Ž . expectation was formed reverse causality , the lower implies a negative w bias in the ␤ s, and the higher implies a positive bias in the ␤ s. 10 We w l l return to this bias and evaluate its severity in Section 5, when we discuss the results. The following variables are selected for x:
ⅷ A time trend and per-capita output, both representing secular effects on the relative supply and demand for skilled labor. The trend 9 Note that in the hypothetical case where all of the x variables were observable, one t could estimate the equations as lt captures longitudinal developments within each country, and per-capita output stresses the differences between countries. These variables are intended to capture the education level of the labor force which, as a relative supply shift, should have a positive effect on l rl and a negative 1 2 effect on w rw . It may also represent shifts in the skill composition of 1 2 output demand, which is likely to be toward skilled labor. In this case, the effects on both l rl and w rw should be positive. Overall, we expect the 1 2 1 2 time trend and per-capital output to have positive effects on l rl but 1 2 uncertain effects on w rw .
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ⅷ Output growth, representing current aggregate shocks. Given the likelihood of a positive correlation with equipment investment, it seems appropriate to hold aggregate economic activity constant to isolate the partial effects of equipment investment.
Obser¨ational Equi¨alence between the Two Mechanisms Gi¨en A¨ailable Data
As mentioned above, both equipment᎐skill complementarity and skill advantage in technology adoption imply that only lagged investment flows should affect the current labor variables. Given that equipment᎐skill complementarity relies on the capital stock, one may consider testing this mechanism separately by constraining lagged investment flows to affect relative wages and employment through the stock of capital. The problem with implementing this procedure is that it requires, under equipment᎐skill complementarity, lagged investment to affect current wages and employment though the capital stock alone. However, by increasing the relative demand for skilled labor, past investment motivates the learning of skills and thus increases the relative supply of skilled labor later on. Therefore, unless the year-by-year changes in the skilled labor force are included in the equationsᎏand not only such long-run proxies as a time trend and per-capita incomeᎏthe coefficients of past investments will reflect both the direct effect through the capital stock and the indirect effect through the increased supply of skilled labor. Given that a year-by-year proxy for the skilled labor force is not available, we cannot test equipment᎐skill complementarity separately by using the capital stock. This renders the two mechanisms indistinguishable in the present empirical framework. 
Estimation Procedure
A panel data estimation routine with fixed country-specific constants is used. Accordingly, all of the slope coefficients are constrained to be the 11 Ž . Barro and Lee 1993 compute measures of formal human capital for a large number of countries over 5-year periods. Hence, these data do not capture the year-by-year changes which are necessary to capture the dynamics involved in the present case. same across countries. However, specific factors, which are not captured by the xs, are allowed for in the country-specific constants.
THE DATA
Three data sets are used: one for wages, another for employment, and a third for investment and other macro data. Our skillrunskilled classification is based on occupation rather than on education and experience. The Ž latter classification is commonly used in the literature e.g., Bartel and Ž . Ž .. Lichtenberg 1987 , and Johnson 1992 . The advantage of the occupation-based definition is that it may better reflect the skill level which is actually used in production. Given the different data sources for wages and employment, the skilledrunskilled classification is not exactly the same for the two variables, as elaborated on below. We report at the end of Section 5 an indirect test which suggests that the mismatch may not be important for the results.
The list of countries included in the panel regressions appears in the Data Appendix, Table A1 . The only criterion for including a country in each regression is that data for all of the variables in that regression are available.
Wages
Ž . The data are from the International Labor Organization ILO October Inquiry, which is an annual international survey. The October Inquiry, initiated in its current form in 1983, is the only detailed survey of wages by occupation and industry available for a large number of countries.
12 The wage data cover 65 countries from all continents and all income levels. For most countries, the data cover the period from the mid-1980s through the Ž . early 1990s about a third of the countries have 5 years of data or less .
To minimize problems with the original data, we limited our coverage to Ž . eight industries mostly nonservices; see the list in the Data Appendix . From the different occupations reported for each industry, we selected ''laborers'' as proxies for unskilled labor and the remaining occupations for skilled labor. Given that only a few industries report professional occupations, we defined skilled production workers as skilled labor. In the absence of employment data according to the same occupational classification, the averages across industries are unweighted. . This data set was used previously by Freeman 1994 . 13 First, average wages by skill levels within each industry were used to compute the industry wage ratio, and then the ratios across industries were averaged.
Whenever monthly wages were not reported, the hourly, daily, or weekly figures were converted into monthly wages, using average hours worked; if not available, a 40-hour week was assumed. In some cases, only contractual wage rates were available. Whenever both actual average earnings and contractual wages were reported, actual earnings were used. In a few countries and for some occupations the wage provided was available only for men or only for women. For the rest, the average covered men and women. A detailed description of the characteristics of the wage data by countries is given in Table A1 . The specific countries entering the wage ratio regressions and the corresponding sample periods are shown in Section 5, following the regression results.
Employment
The employment data are from the ILO Statistical Database. They cover Ž 52 countries for the period 1970᎐1993 about 20 countries have data only . from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s . This database includes economy-wide employment and unemployment by a broad occupational classification. Skilled workers include professional, technical, and related workers, as well as administrative and managerial workers. The unskilled category comprises production and related workers, transport equipment operators, and laborersᎏall of which are reported together. For this reason, the skilledrunskilled definition for the employment data differs from that used for the wage data: unskilled labor in the employment data includes all production workers, while in the wage data, skilled production workers are categorized as skilled labor.
We did not include a number of occupationsᎏclerical and related workers, sales workers, service and agricultural workers, animal husbandry and forestry workersᎏwhere the classification between skilled and unskilled seems less meaningful in the present context. Given that these occupations make up the majority of labor in the service and agriculture sectors, our definition of the skilledrunskilled ratio is roughly parallel to Ž . that of nonproductionrproduction workers used by Berman et al. 1994 for manufacturing only.
The list of countries entering the employment ratio regressions and the corresponding sample periods are shown in Section 5, following the regression results.
Macroeconomic Data
GDP and investment data are from the Penn World Tables developed Ž . by Summers and Heston 1991 . A summary of the definitions of variables constructed is given in the Data Appendix.
RESULTS
The main findings do suggest a positive effect of machinery investment on the relative demand for skilled labor, i.e., on both the relative wage and relative employment. Capturing the effects of machinery investment at different lags is econometrically problematic, given the strong serial correlation of the machinery investmentrGDP ratio: 0.94᎐0.96 in the different samples considered. Hence, in Section 5.1 we start with a simple specification which includes basically one lag only and address the dynamics further in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 reports an additional test, which addresses the mismatch in the definitions of skilled labor for wages and employment.
Basic Results
We first address the wage ratio and then the employment ratio estimates, discussing the links between them. Table I reports the results for the wage ratio equation under different specifications. The regressions include data from 37 to 38 countries and, as shown in the list in Table II , the samples vary across countries within the period from the mid-1980s to 1992. All regressions incorporate countryspecific dummies.
Investment in machinery as a percentage of GDP with a lag of 1 year, Ž . IMACHY y1 , enters all of the specifications positively and significantly at the 1% level. Column 1 of Table I reports a basic formulation with three additional variables: income per capita, YCAP, and a time trend, YEAR, to capture long-run developments, and GDP growth, DY, to capture current aggregate shocks. YCAP does not have a significant effect on the wage ratio. As discussed in Section 3.1, this may reflect the offsetting effects of a larger supply of skilled labor in more developed countries and a higher demand for skilled-labor-intensive goods. YEAR represents factors similar to YCAP but stresses the time series aspect within each country. The negative and significant coefficient of YEAR suggests a high skill premium at the beginning of the sample, in the mid-1980s, and a decline over time since then, probably reflecting a steady increase in the supply of more educated workers. The coefficient of DY is negative, although insignificant. The negative coefficient is consistent with the notion that unskilled labor demand, which is likely to require little investment in firm-specific human capital, is more sensitive to short-run fluctuations. In contrast, the hiring of skilled labor is likely to require specific training and hence occurs gradually over time as the economy expands. This implies countercyclical behavior in both wage and employment ratios.
The theoretical considerations in Section 2 imply that only lagged equipment investments are relevant. Column 2 of Table I tests this implication by including current IMACHY. The coefficient is insignificant, as the theory predicts. Equipment investment with a 2-year lag is introduced in Column 3, but it turns out to be statistically insignificant as well.
Ž . Other investments, relative to GDP, OIY y1 , are included in Column 4 to test whether it is indeed machinery investment which has the positive effect, or whether it is proxying for investment in general. The considerations reviewed in Section 2 imply that OIY, which includes all private investment except for equipment, as well as public investment, should have no effect. Surprisingly, the coefficient turns out to be negative and significant, suggesting complementarity between other capital and unskilled labor. Table III reports the same set of regressions as Table I , but with the employment ratio as the dependent variable. The number of countries included here is 35. As Table IV shows, the set of countries covered in these regressions overlaps only partially with the list in Table II , and the sample periods here are longer: they range from the early 1970s to 1992. The coefficient of machinery investment is positive in all of the specifica-Ž Ž . . tions excluding Column 3, which includes IMACHY y2 , but the significance level is sensitive to the specification. These results, particularly the Ž . positive and significant coefficient of IMACHY y2 , led us to examine Ž . longer lags. Running the basic specification Column 1 in Table III with an increasing number of IMACHY lags indicates that the strongest effect Ž . is after 3 years: when IMACHY y3 is included, the other lags, including the fourth, are insignificant. Hence, the employment ratio equations are Ž . Ž . reestimated with IMACHY y3 replacing IMACHY y1 ; these are listed in Table V. Ž . Column 1 in Table V lists the basic specifications with IMACHY y3 having a positive and significant effect. The long lag until machinery investment affects the employment ratio, and the short lag for the effect on the wage ratio suggests that the supply of skilled labor is inelastic in the short run but quite elastic in the longer run.
14 We return to the dynamic effects of investment in Section 5.2.
Ž . Ž The effect of other investment OIY y1 is negative and significant see . Column 2 in Table V , as in the wage ratio equation. This strengthens the impression of complementarity between other forms of capital and unskilled labor, as suggested by the wage ratio regressions.
The positive and significant coefficient of YCAP is consistent with both Ž a higher stock of human capital in higher-income countries a supply . Ž effect and a higher demand for skilled labor-intensive goods a demand . effect , as discussed earlier in the context of the wage ratio. There, these two effects offset each other, while here they both increase the employment ratio. DY has a negative and significant effect, as it has on the wage ratio, supporting the notion discussed earlier that unskilled labor demand is more sensitive to the cycle than is skilled labor demand. The time trend, 14 Note, however, that an increase in the relative input of skilled labor may occur earlier if the number of hours per worker is increased. representing within-country long-run demand and supply effects, has, as expected, a positive and significant coefficient. It is interesting to check whether the impact of machinery investment depends systematically on the income level of the country. A presumption tested is that the supply of skilled labor responds more elastically in higher income countries, leading to stronger relative employment and weaker relative wage responses. This test was carried out by including an interaction term between IMACHY and YCAP. The results are reported in Columns 5 of Tables I and III. The interaction term in Table I turns out to be negative and marginally significant, consistent with the presumption above. However, the interaction term in Table III is negative, although statistically insignificant. Overall, therefore, this test does not suggest a systematic pattern across income levels.
Lagged In¨estment Effects
Ž
As mentioned above, the IMACHY autocorrelation is very high 0.96 for . the wage sample and 0.94 for the employment sample . Hence, capturing separate effects of subsequent lags is econometrically difficult. Given that the dynamics are a key component in the mechanism under study, the Note. t-Statistics, in parentheses, are computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All equations include country-specific constants.
. Ž . equations were reestimated with IMACHY y1 , IMACHY y3 , Ž . IMACHY y5 , etc. The problem of a strong correlation between two subsequent investment lags is thereby weakened, and, at the same time, longer dynamics can be detected without imposing a structure on the year-by-year lags at the estimation stage. To identify the year-by-year coefficients in the current procedure, some assumption regarding the structure is required after the estimation. We return to this point below.
Table VI reports the results. Columns 1 and 2 refer to the wage ratio, and Columns 3, 4, and 5 to the employment ratio. As in the basic results, the machinery investment lags are shorter for relative wages than for Ž . relative employment. In Columns 1 and 2, only IMACHY y1 is signifi-Ž . cant, although IMACHY y3 also has a positive and quantitatively important coefficient. In contrast, in the employment equation, Columns 3 and Ž . 4, it is the first lag which is insignificant, while IMACHY y3 and Ž . IMACHY y5 are significant. Additional lags of up to 9 years are in-Ž . cluded and reported in Column 5. IMACHY y7 turns out to be signifi-Ž . cant, but IMACHY y9 does not.
As previously mentioned, the results suggest a very small elasticity of skilled labor supply in the short run, but a larger elasticity in the longer Note. t-Statistics, in parentheses, are computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All equations include country-specific constants.
. run after at least 2 years . The dynamics following an IMACHY shift can thus be described as follows. Once it is incorporated into the equipment stock, investment has a strong impact on the relative wage of skilled labor, but little effect on relative employment. Given higher wages, the relative supply of skilled labor increases through learning, thereby lowering the wage ratio and raising the employment ratio. This brings the relative wage back to the original level, but relative employment remains high for several more years.
Quantitatively, a 1-year, one-percentage-point increase in the machinery investmentroutput ratio raises the wage differential after a year by about Ž . 0.09, or 6.5% the average wage ratio is 1.4 . As mentioned above, the effect thereafter is smaller and statistically insignificant. The corresponding impact on relative employment can be judged by the sum of the IMACHY coefficients, which equals 2.9 in Column 5. Given that not all of the lags are included, one needs an additional assumption to identify the year-by-year path of the coefficients. Assuming that starting from the third Ž . lag the first that is significant the effect declines linearly, reaching zero at the ninth lag, the resulting coefficients are 0. 83, 0.69, 0.55, 0.41, 0.28, 0.14, and 0 . This implies that a 1-year, one-percentage-point increase in the machinery investmentroutput ratio raises the employment ratio by 0.8, or Ž . by about 1.5% after 3 years the average employment ratio is 0.57 , with the effect declining gradually over 6 more years. Considering the strong serial correlation of the IMACHY variable, and its standard deviation of over two percentage points, one may conclude that this is an important source of variation in the relative demand for skilled labor.
The results in Table VI regarding the other explanatory variables remain essentially the same as those reported in Section 5.1.
As discussed in Section 3, the possibility exists that the IMACHY coefficients in the wage and employment equations are biased. The exis-Ž . tence of this bias requires that 1 there are relative shocks that are not Ž . captured by the other explanatory variables, and 2 the relative shocks are anticipated in advanceᎏgiven that only lags of the IMACHY variables Ž . enter the regression. From condition 1 it follows that these shocks should be temporary deviations from long-run trends as represented by YEAR Ž and YCAP for example, immigration shocks with a particular skill compo-. Ž . sition . Then, however, it is difficult to satisfy condition 2 , because it does not seem reasonable that such temporary shocks can be anticipated too Ž . much in advance say 3 years or more . Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Ž . Ž . coefficients of IMACHY y3 , . . . , IMACHY y9 are problematic. The Ž . coefficients of IMACHY y1 might still be biasedᎏnegatively in the wage equation and positively in the employment equation. However, the Ž . fact that the coefficient of IMACHY y1 on w rw is positive suggests 1 2 that the dominant direction of causality is from investment to the labor market. Furthermore, the coefficient in the employment equation is fairly small. Therefore, the bias, if it exists, should also be small.
An Additional Test
As discussed in Section 4, the definition of skilled and unskilled labor employed for the wage and employment data are different. The mismatch is due to the inclusion of skilled production workers in the skilled category for wages and in the unskilled category for employment. For two industries, however, chemicals and electric light and power, the wages for professional occupations are available. Hence, the wage ratio of profes-Ž . sionals to laborers can be computed similar to the employment ratio and used to test the wage ratio equation results. The regression results for this wage ratio are reported in Tables VII and VIII. They are qualitatively similar to those in Table I . One difference that does appear is the larger magnitude of the IMACHY coefficients, which is consistent with a monotonically increasing effect of machinery investment on labor demand by skill level. In other words, the demand effect is stronger on professionals, weaker on skilled production workers, and weakest on laborers. 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS The evidence reported in this paper supports the hypothesis that equipment investment has a positive effect on the relative demand for skilled labor. The results indicate a positive response of the relative wage of skilled labor after 1 year, followed later by an increase in relative employment. This suggests that the supply of skilled labor is inelastic in the short run, but that it reacts positively after a period of training. The present results should be placed in perspective by recalling that the wage and employment data come from different sources and differ in the respect discussed earlier.
The present empirical formulation and data set do not make it possible to distinguish between two transmission mechanisms of equipment investment to labor differentials: equipment᎐skill complementarity in production and skill advantage in technology adoption. The lack of a significant Ž effect of the current increase in the equipment stock machinery invest-. ment with a lag of 1 year on the current relative employment of skilled labor does not seem to support the need for skilled labor in technology adoption. However, it is possible that the relative input of skilled labor does respond immediately through an increase in hours per worker rather Ž than in employment, given the time involved in training new workers. Our . data set does not include hours per worker.
Investment other than that in machinery has, surprisingly, a negative effect on both relative wages and relative employment of skilled workers. Ž This suggests complementarity between other capital private and public . structures and unskilled labor. The effects of more disaggregated investment seem to be an interesting direction to pursue.
Time works in the direction of reducing wage differentials during the period covered by the wage data, from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. This is a partial effect of time, which probably reflects high wage differentials at the beginning of this period and an increase in the skill level of the labor force during the period. Income per capita, which varies dramatically across the countries in the sample, is very positively correlated with the relative employment of skilled labor, as one may expect, but uncorrelated with the relative wage. One explanation for this result is that in higher-income economies, both the relative supply and the relative demand for skilled labor are higher, the effects of which cancel out on the relative wage but affect relative employment in the same direction.
DATA APPENDIX
The list of countries included in the panel regressions is shown in Table  AI , along with the details of the labor data. ERATIO: Ratio of the employment of professional, technical, and related workers q administrative and managerial workers to the employment of production and related workers, transport equipment operators, and laborers. 
Macro Data
